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Abstract: Public and research libraries have long provided resources in electronic formats,  and 
the tension between providing electronic resources and patron privacy is widely recognized. But 
assessing trade-offs between privacy and access to electronic resources remains difficult. One 
reason is a conceptual problem regarding intellectual freedom. Traditionally, the LIS literature 
has plausibly understood privacy as a facet of intellectual freedom. However, while certain types 
of electronic resource use may diminish patron privacy, thereby diminishing intellectual 
freedom, the opportunities created by such resources also appear liberty-enhancing. 
Adjudicating between privacy loss and enhanced opportunities on intellectual freedom grounds 
must therefore provide an account of intellectual freedom capable of addressing both privacy 
and opportunity. I will argue that intellectual freedom is a form of positive freedom, where a 
person’s freedom is a function of the quality of her agency. Using this view as the lodestar, I 
articulate several principles for assessing adoption of electronic resources and privacy 
protections. 
 
I. Introduction 
Public and research libraries have long been providing an increasing proportion of resources in 
electronic formats, including Internet access generally, electronic databases, electronic journals, 
and electronic books. This move toward electronic resources can diminish patron privacy. For 
example, libraries often contract for electronic resources with vendors who offer customized 
services to users  (e.g., the ability to create personal profiles, store articles, and record search 
histories). These services allow the vendors to collect and store patron information, even though 
library policies often preclude such collection (Magi 2010). Another example is electronic book 
lending via Amazon’s Kindle service. Borrowing books via Kindle requires registering for a Kindle 
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account, logging in to that account, and allowing Amazon to track one’s borrowing. That also 
allows Amazon to combine information about borrowing with information it has garnered from 
Kindle book purchases and other transactions with Amazon. Libraries wishing to lend books in 
Kindle format can at most provide a warning to patrons about Amazon’s privacy policies. 
The tension between the provision of electronic resources and patron privacy is widely 
recognized in the Library and Information Studies (LIS) literature. But a consensus regarding how 
to assess trade-offs between patron privacy and access to electronic resources remains elusive  
(Litwin 2006; Corrado 2000; Parry 2012). One reason is that there is a conceptual problem 
regarding the nature of intellectual freedom.  
The gist of the issue is this: Traditionally, the LIS literature and the library profession 
have, very plausibly, understood patron privacy as a facet of intellectual freedom (ALA 2010, 
305-319;  Bowers 2006). And while electronic resource use, coupled with policies regarding that 
use, may diminish patron privacy, thereby diminishing intellectual freedom, the opportunities 
created by such resources also appear liberty-enhancing. Any attempt to adjudicate between 
privacy loss and enhanced opportunities on intellectual freedom grounds must therefore 
provide an account of intellectual freedom capable of addressing both privacy and opportunity. 
That is my task here. After describing several current practices in library provision of electronic 
resources, I explain why several of the most important philosophical conceptions of freedom fail 
to provide a plausible account of intellectual freedom. I then offer a different view, according to 
which intellectual freedom is best understood as a form of positive freedom, where a person’s 
intellectual freedom is a function of the quality of her agency within a certain domain. Using 
quality of a person’s agency as the lodestar, I set forth several principles for assessing the 
provision of electronic resources, privacy protections, and the trade-offs between them. 
The contribution of the essay is several-fold. It addresses the tension between electronic 
resource use and patron privacy. More fundamentally, though, it addresses a difficulty in 
conceptualizing a key LIS principle: intellectual freedom. In attempting to provide an adequate 
conception, the paper draws on the rich philosophical literature on freedom. Hence, it links the 
LIS scholarly and professional literature to work outside the discipline.1 
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II. Three Issues 
Three issues regarding library provision of electronic resources serve as a starting point. The first 
is library contracts with electronic resource vendors who offer customized services (e.g., the 
ability to create personal profiles, store articles, and record search histories). In a study of 
vendors of electronic resources to libraries, Magi (2010) has described a number of services by 
which such vendors may collect personal information from library patrons. For example, 
vendors may allow users to save searches to an individual profile, save preferences for search 
interfaces, send results to others via email with the user’s account, and so forth (Magi 2010, 
256–57). Moreover, vendor privacy policies are highly varied and not always consistent with 
library and information technology industry standards (Magi 2010,  263–67). 
The second issue regards lending of e-books through third parties which in turn collect 
patron information, for example via Amazon’s Kindle service. Although libraries have provided 
access to electronic books for some time, in 2011 libraries in the U.S. began entering into 
agreements to provide patrons access to electronic books via Amazon’s Kindle service. That 
allows patrons to read books on Kindle devices and other devices (phones, tablets, laptops) with 
Kindle software. Borrowing books from libraries via Kindle requires registering for a Kindle 
account, logging in to that account, and allowing Amazon to track one’s borrowing. Moreover, 
because many folks borrowing books via Kindle already have Kindles or Kindle-enabled devices, 
they already have purchased books for their devices from Amazon. Many of these people also 
buy other products from Amazon. Because the borrowing of Kindle books is associated with 
one’s Kindle account, which is also associated with the rest of one’s account with Amazon, the 
books one borrows via Kindle are associated with lots more information attached to one’s 
identity (e.g., notes added, how much the person has read) (Goldberg 2011). In turn, Amazon 
can combine information gleaned via Kindle borrowing with other information it has collected or 
purchased and use it for both commercial purposes (e.g., enhancing Amazon’s understanding of 
consumer behavior) and for purposes that may benefit readers (e.g., facilitating reading 
recommendations).  
Hence, when one borrows a book in Kindle format from her library, her privacy 
regarding her reading and other aspects of her life diminish. Recognizing that this diminution of 
privacy makes Kindle borrowing different from other types of book borrowing, some libraries 
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issue a warning to patrons borrowing Kindle books that the library privacy policies do not 
necessarily apply. See figures 1 and 2.  
 
 
Figure 1 
 
After the patron is warned that she is leaving the public library domain, and indicates agreement 
to do so, she is directed to Amazon’s Kindle site, where she can borrow the e-book. Because the 
patron must be logged in under an existing Kindle account, information about the borrowing is 
correlated with that account. See figure 2.   
 
 
Figure 2 
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But the privacy issue is just part of the story. Electronic books in general, and Kindle 
books in particular, have become an important part of reading, and many library patrons would 
like them to become a larger part of their library borrowing. A recent study published by the 
Pew Research Center found that, as of 2011, the OverDrive Media Console (a platform for 
lending electronic resources, including e-books) had been installed on 11 million devices (with 5 
million installs coming in 2011 alone) (Pew Research Center 2012b, 11). And there is significant 
interest in learning how to use and borrow e-books among people who don’t yet do so.  Despite 
the growth in e-book reading and borrowing, interest in borrowing e-books, and number of 
OverDrive installations, there is unrealized potential for library patrons to read e-books. The 
percentage of library patrons who borrow e-books is small and there are several ways in which 
patrons are frustrated when they do attempt to borrow e-books. They report long waits for 
titles, having titles available only in formats that are incompatible with the patron’s reading 
device, and lack of library access to desired titles (Pew Research Center 2012b, 12, 52).  
The modest use and frustrations of e-book borrowing in libraries stands in contrast to 
the more significant penetration of electronic books in the commercial sphere (Pew Research 
Center 2012a). This may help explain why there are tensions between libraries and publishers 
(Pew Research Center 2012b, 12, 61). This is made all the more salient in light of a more recent 
study released finding e-book and e-reader use rates in 2012 were substantially higher than in 
previous years, while paper book reading declined slightly (Pew Research Center 2013).  
Moreover, the better-developed commercial side of e-books actually aids library patrons 
seeking content to read electronically. Many patrons, for example, use Amazon’s site to find 
recommended titles and then request those titles from their local libraries (Pew Research 
Center 2012b, 58).  
The e-book issue in many ways parallels a third aspect of electronic resource use—the 
move toward electronic journals, in particular for scholarly publications. University and research 
libraries have been providing electronic access to journals for some time, and access to those 
journals is generally made pursuant to licensing contracts. Those contracts may have provisions 
requiring libraries to monitor user activity to detect unauthorized use, cooperate in 
investigations into unauthorized use, and notify publishers of any unauthorized use. 
Commentators have noted that such provisions create potential privacy issues for patrons 
(Lipinski 2013, 452; Harris 2009, 69).  Moreover, because publishers providing access to 
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electronic journals are generally not subject to state library privacy laws, they may be able to 
gather and share information about patrons more extensively than libraries could (Lipinski 2013, 
453).  
III. Intellectual Freedom and Privacy 
So, access to information in electronic formats is important to people generally, and to library 
patrons specifically. Yet, in at least some cases the access that patrons would like requires 
sharing personal information about reading habits and intellectual interests with third parties—
which is to say it requires giving up privacy in those regards. Because privacy protection has long 
been considered an aspect of intellectual freedom in the LIS literature, it would appear that such 
privacy losses conflict with intellectual freedom. In order to assess such potential conflict it is 
crucial to delve a bit deeper into the connection between electronic resources, privacy, and 
intellectual freedom.  
Here it is important to be explicit about the nature and structure of my argument, which 
can be summarized as follows. First, intellectual freedom is important, and it is something that 
libraries and the library profession value greatly. This is both plausible and consistent with the 
LIS literature on intellectual freedom. Second, intellectual freedom provides the justification for 
privacy protections for library records. This claim is based on the professional and scholarly 
literature on privacy and reading. The American Library Association (ALA) and the International 
Federation of Library Associations and Institutions (IFLA) expressly link privacy to intellectual 
freedom. In a statement of support for intellectual freedom under the United Nations Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, the IFLA states that “Library users shall have the right to personal 
privacy and anonymity. Librarians and other library staff shall not disclose the identity of users 
or the materials they use to a third party” (IFLA 1999). The ALA maintains that “rights of privacy 
are necessary for intellectual freedom and are fundamental to the ethics and practice of 
librarianship.” (ALA 2002; see also ALA 2010, 255-293). A number of legal and LIS scholars have 
likewise linked reading privacy to intellectual freedom (Magi 2011; Richards 2008; Bowers 2006; 
Blitz 2005; Cohen 2001).  
But the precise link between intellectual freedom and privacy protections is unclear. 
How, in other words, must we understand intellectual freedom, if it is to provide a plausible 
ground for privacy protections? This is the basis for a third claim:  for intellectual freedom to 
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ground privacy protections, it must be understood as a type of positive freedom, specifically a 
quality of agency, such that a person is free only if she acts autonomously. And by extension, 
intellectual freedom is a quality of agency, such that a person is free within intellectual domains 
only if she acts autonomously within those domains. Explaining this third claim and its extension 
is the primary task of sections III and IV of the paper. In part V, I argue that because libraries 
value intellectual freedom, they have reasons to ensure that patrons act autonomously with 
respect to intellectual endeavors and provide a framework for assessing potentially privacy 
diminishing electronic resources in libraries. 
What is Privacy? 
Although privacy is a contested concept, for the purposes of this essay we can stipulate that 
privacy involves limited access by others to information about a person. That is, for a person (P) 
to have privacy regarding her reading habits (for example) with respect to some other person 
(Q) just means that Q has limited access to information about P’s reading habits. On this view, 
control of one’s information is neither necessary nor sufficient for one to have privacy. 
Moreover, this view does not assume that privacy only pertains to important or valuable 
information. One may have privacy regarding mundane information or information to which 
others have a claim. The type of information and others’ claims to access will be relevant in 
determining whether one has a right to privacy and to whether privacy is valuable under specific 
circumstances, but not to whether one actually has privacy in a particular case (see Rubel, 2011; 
Allen, 1988; DeCew, 1995 for discussion of different conceptions of privacy). Note, though, that 
the arguments outlined here do not turn on the specific details of this account of privacy.  
What is Intellectual Freedom? 
Whether, and the degree to which, privacy loss implicates intellectual freedom will turn on the 
proper conception of freedom. There are a number of different ways in which we can conceive 
of freedom generally, and intellectual freedom specifically. However, in an article about the 
state of intellectual freedom in digital environments, Eliza Dresang notes that the ALA has never 
proffered a uniform definition of intellectual freedom, and offers a definition extrapolated from 
various ALA sources: 
Intellectual freedom as a concept in librarianship means freedom to think or 
believe what one will, freedom to express one’s thoughts and beliefs in 
unrestricted manners and means, and freedom to access information and ideas 
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regardless of the content or viewpoints of the author(s) or the age, background, 
or beliefs of the receiver (Dresang 2006, 169). 
This definition is certainly consistent with ALA and IFLA documents on intellectual freedom. 
However, it highlights a deeper conceptual problem: it incorporates into the definition of 
‘intellectual freedom’ the more basic concept of freedom. That is not to say the definition is 
unhelpful—it is useful in that it delimits the domains of intellectual freedom: thought, belief, 
expression, access to information. Nonetheless, to understand what constitutes a loss of 
freedom within that domain requires an account of freedom simpliciter. And just what freedom 
simpliciter means is at the core of the issue under consideration here. That is, addressing the 
conflict between privacy and electronic resource use in terms of intellectual freedom requires 
that we address the question of what sense of freedom operates in the conception of 
intellectual freedom.  
In the following, I analyze several of the most prominent philosophical conceptions of 
freedom and argue that each has important limitations, either as a conception of freedom or as 
a conception of freedom that can underwrite privacy protections. I then argue for a different 
understanding. 
Negative Freedom 
In liberal political theory and moral philosophy the predominant conception of liberty is 
negative liberty, or the absence of external constraints on a person’s actions (Berlin 1969; Carter 
2008). One’s negative freedom to (say) read a text would be limited by laws banning the text, 
laws prohibiting reading the text, and others’ physically blocking one from accessing the text 
(among other things). One’s negative freedom to read that text would not be limited by an 
inability to read the language the text is in, lack of resources to afford access to the text, or 
preoccupation with other matters.2 There are some reasons that the negative conception is 
attractive as a basis for our understanding of intellectual freedom. One reason is that any liberal 
political theory will place some importance on negative freedom—coercive threats, legal 
threats, and physical constraints are on any plausible view restrictions of liberty. Another is that 
it provides an account of the importance of core aspects of intellectual freedom: book bans and 
internet filters, for example, place constraints on persons’ abilities to access information, and 
the negative account explains why they diminish intellectual freedom. Moreover, the language 
of professional library documents reflects a negative conception of liberty. The ALA, for 
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example, states that intellectual freedom consists in the ability to “seek and receive information 
from all points of view without restriction” (American Library Association 2010) (emphasis 
added). 
However, defending privacy as a facet of intellectual freedom in this negative sense is 
incomplete. It can account for the effect on intellectual freedom in some cases of privacy loss, 
specifically those where privacy loss leads to harms to patrons or creates other external 
obstacles to their intellectual activities. However, it cannot explain why loss of privacy 
diminishes intellectual freedom in cases where no such harms or limits to intellectual activities 
result. That is because loss of privacy does not by itself constrain a person’s intellectual 
activities; one is not prevented from doing anything solely in virtue of information disclosure. 
Rather, for negative liberty to be affected by privacy loss, it must be due to some further 
impediment caused by the privacy loss—for example, by others denying a person some 
opportunity, material benefit, or other liberty. Absent such further constraints, privacy loss can 
only affect intellectual endeavors insofar as persons are affected by beliefs about their being 
observed—often referred to as “chilling” effects. Such effects are psychological limitations, even 
where they are utterly reasonable. But psychological limitations are not external constraints, 
and hence they do not implicate negative liberty; rather, they implicate a form of positive 
liberty, to which I turn next. 
Internal Positive Freedom 
In contrast to negative conceptions of liberty, positive conceptions concern the ability to act 
with a degree of control over one’s life or in accord with what one values even where there are 
not constraints imposed externally. One way to understand this sort of freedom is in terms of a 
person’s ability to act according to the desires of her higher or her more rational self (carter 
2008). Suppose, for example, that Ari has a desire to read Infinite Jest; he likes David Foster 
Wallace’s writing, owns a copy of the book, and genuinely enjoys reading. Moreover, he 
recognizes that reading the book will be good for him in that he will enjoy reading the book, 
enjoy discussing it with others, and appreciate how it makes him look at the world. However, Ari 
is obsessed (one might say addicted) to playing Call of Duty. He spends the majority of his 
waking hours playing, sneaks time playing while at work, loses sleep, and so forth. He recognizes 
that it is a problem, genuinely wants to do other things (especially read Infinite Jest), wishes he 
could tear himself away, disconnects his computer from the Internet for periods of time, and so 
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forth. But Ari always seems to find himself back in his gaming chair. There are no external 
constraints on Ari’s ability to read Infinite Jest. No one prevents him. He would not consider the 
time spent away from Call of Duty to be a loss. Nonetheless, Ari wishes to read the book and 
wishes to read it instead of playing Call of Duty. That is, Ari’s higher or more rational self would 
read Infinite Jest. Yet his obsession makes him unfree to do so.  
For Ari to become free to read Infinite Jest does not require that barriers be removed, 
but for Ari to gain something positive—namely control over his desires. The thing to be gained is 
internal to the agent, and his gaining control would make him free insofar as it would allow him 
to act on his desire to read Infinite Jest by empowering him to eliminate the conflicting desire to 
play Call of Duty (Berlin 1969; Carter 2008). Call this “internal positive freedom.” 
If we understand intellectual freedom as a kind of internal positive freedom, a person 
has intellectual freedom if and only if she is capable of acting according to her higher or more 
rational desires. This view is attractive for a couple of reasons. First, it can explain why effects 
upon a person’s intellectual habits implicate intellectual freedom even where there are no 
harms to a person’s other interests, well-being, opportunities, and so forth. This in turn provides 
an account as to why privacy loss can diminish intellectual freedom where that privacy loss 
affects one psychologically only. Put another way, the internal positive view explains why self-
censorship due to others’ monitoring one’s reading can count as an impingement of freedom 
regardless of whether that monitoring leads to any distinct harms. In this respect the internal 
positive view comports with several accounts of the underlying justifications for privacy 
protections in the name of intellectual freedom, which posit that disclosure of information 
about reading or other intellectual habits will “chill” persons’ activities (see, for example, 
Richards 2008; Blitz 2005; Cohen 1996).  
Alas, despite its advantages, the account is unsatisfactory. The biggest liability is that on 
the internal positive view, shaping the desires of one’s ‘higher’ self preserves one’s freedom just 
as much as gaining the capacity to act in accord with one’s previously-existing higher-order 
desires. So, for Ari to be internally positively free, which is to say for Ari to be able to act in 
accord with his higher or more rational desires and values, he could either forego playing Call of 
Duty (perhaps by ridding his house of gaming devices, canceling his Internet access, putting his 
money in an inaccessible place, and so forth) so that he can actually sit down and read Infinite 
Jest, or he could change his desires such that he only wishes to play Call of Duty (perhaps by 
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being counseled or brainwashed into thinking Call of Duty is the most important thing he could 
ever do).  If he comes to view Infinite Jest as unimportant, and to view Call of Duty as 
particularly important, Ari would be internally positively free, even if he is driven as if by 
addiction to play Call of Duty in any case. Surely, though, his inability to do otherwise renders Ari 
unfree.3 
Another problem is that on the internal positive freedom view, lack of privacy might on 
balance actually enhance freedom. Suppose, for example, that many people wish to read better 
books, watch more highbrow movies, and browse more enlightening corners of the Web. 
However, each of us is drawn to pot-boilers, Hollywood blockbusters, and perezhilton.com, 
despite the desire of our rational selves not to be. The internal positive account would allow that 
persons’ intellectual freedom could be increased where their reading, watching, and browsing 
habits are open for all to see: persons’ internal constraints (i.e., their being drawn to material 
they would rather avoid) could be overcome by using the power of others’ observation and 
disapproval to influence their behaviors for the better, on the criteria for “better” that the 
agents themselves would endorse. Note that this a problem for the internal positive view only 
insofar as it weakens the link between intellectual freedom and privacy (contradicting the 
second premise of the main argument).  
So, the internal positive account can explain privacy’s relation to intellectual freedom in 
a way that the negative account cannot. However, like the negative account, the internal 
positive view is incomplete insofar as it would allow that changes to one’s desires, even without 
control of one’s actions, is freedom preserving and implies that lack of privacy could actually 
increase freedom.4 
One Freedom 
A number of commentators have rejected the distinction between negative freedom, or 
freedom from external constraints, and internal positive freedom, arguing instead that there is 
just one sense of freedom that accounts for both external and internal constraints (MacCallum 
1967; Nelson 2005). On this type of view freedom is a three-part relation between an agent, an 
action the agent desires to take, and a constraint on that agent’s ability to take the action. An 
agent is free insofar as certain possible constraints on her actions do not obtain. The advantages 
of this sort of view are important. Arbitrarily marking off some kinds of constraints as “external,” 
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and hence liberty-constraining, and others as “internal” and not relevantly liberty-constraining is 
oddly artificial, and the one freedom view avoids doing so. It also can accommodate the fact 
that many limitations to liberty involve a combination of internal and external constraints. So, 
the person who suffers penalties for her actions has her negative liberty impinged, and where 
that leads her to act reluctantly even where no further penalties would result, her positive 
liberty is impinged.  
But the one freedom view is still not an adequate account of intellectual freedom. Most 
important is that, like the internal positive account, it must always interpret changes in one’s 
desires due to one’s inability to act according to antecedent desires as preserving liberty. 
Moreover, it cannot accommodate the possibility that desire formation can impinge liberty, an 
issue to which I turn in the following section. 
So far I have explained why several of the predominant philosophical accounts of 
freedom are poor foundations for an account of intellectual freedom and fail to provide 
freedom-based grounds for privacy protections. One might argue that this is evidence that 
privacy is not a facet of freedom or intellectual freedom. That would require abandoning the 
attempt to ground protections for library patron privacy in intellectual freedom, which is one of 
the basic premises of this paper and a central tenet of LIS professional values. Fortunately there 
is another avenue.  
IV. A Different Conception 
Rather than understanding freedom (and hence intellectual freedom) as a function of 
constraints upon actions alone, we can understand it as a quality of agency, as argued 
extensively in Christman (2005) and Christman (1991). According to this view a person is free 
only if she acts autonomously. And hence, that person is intellectually free only if she engages in 
intellectual activities autonomously. To say that one acts autonomously or engages in 
intellectual activities autonomously is to say that those actions are in an important sense one’s 
own, based on one’s ability to self-govern, and in accord with one’s values to the extent that 
one sees fit. This view is compatible with the constraints-based views addressed above, insofar 
as constraints on one’s ability to act are limitations on one’s autonomy. It is also compatible 
with the internal positive freedom view insofar as constraints on one’s ability to act on one’s 
13 
 
DRAFT: Please cite to final version, Library Quarterly 84(2) (April 2014):183-208. 
 
higher-order interests—including psychological constraints—are limitations on one’s ability to 
act autonomously.  
What is important about the autonomy view is that freedom demands more than the 
mere absence of constraints. To begin, it provides an account of how desire formation matters 
for freedom. Where a person’s character, values, and desires are formed without the ability to 
consider and reflect upon reasonable alternatives, it would seem that person’s freedom is 
diminished, and the autonomy view can explain why. Consider the case of a person raised in 
oppressive circumstances. Suppose that Ruby is raised in an insular community in which 
members of her social class are subservient, raised to have no aspirations beyond servitude, and 
provided no opportunities beyond servitude. Suppose also that Ruby fully internalizes those 
values and wants to live accordingly. If Ruby moves outside the community, to a place that 
protects equality across social classes, there would be no constraints on her ability to pursue 
options other than servitude. She is neither externally constrained from acting nor internally 
constrained from acting on higher or rational desires. Nonetheless, due to the depth of her 
indoctrination, Ruby may want nothing of the increased opportunity. It would seem that Ruby is 
unfree, despite the removal of constraints. Freedom-as-autonomy provides an explanation as to 
why. Ruby’s lack of freedom is a function of her upbringing, under which her desires, values, and 
character formed without ample opportunity to consider and reflect on reasonable alternatives 
(Christman 1991, 345). That is an affront to autonomy, not necessarily a constraint on desires or 
ability to act in accord with desires.  
To further illustrate the relation between agency and desire formation, we can revisit 
the example of Ari’s desire to read Infinite Jest. We can imagine a case in which Ari changes his 
higher level desire from reading Infinite Jest to playing Call of Duty under unreasonable, external 
pressures. Perhaps the book is censored, and Ari’s employer threatens to fire anyone even 
rumored to read it. Certainly those count as external constraints (and, hence, limitations of 
negative intellectual freedom). But they also would conflict with Ari’s agency. The reason he 
changes his higher level interests is an unjustifiable form of pressure, which limited Ari’s ability 
to fully consider a reasonable alternative. That is, Ari’s ability to consider the reasonable 
alternative desire of reading Infinite Jest is saddled with inordinate, negative pressure, and that 
undermines Ari’s autonomy, even though Ari will eventually be able to act consistently with his 
actual preference of playing Call of Duty.  
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The autonomy view also provides an explanation of the importance of constraints. 
When constraints matter, the explanation for why they matter is not simply that they are 
constraints of any old sort. Rather, they matter because they impose limitations on things of 
value. The view offered here is based on the view that personal autonomy is important, and 
limitations on autonomy are at least prima facie morally bad.  
This autonomy conception of freedom can explain how privacy loss can be freedom-
impinging even where that loss is not accompanied by harms to one’s interests. Autonomy, as 
noted, includes the ability to act according to one’s reasons. The self-monitoring and potential 
self-censorship, or redirecting of one’s intellectual activities, that may result from surveillance 
undermines the degree to which one’s actions and intellectual endeavors are based on one’s 
higher-level interests. Recall that the ability to account for such cases was a strength of the 
internal positive view. But there is an important difference: the internal positive view alone 
must allow that changes in desires are every bit as freedom-preserving as acting in accord with 
one’s already-existing desires. The autonomy conception, in contrast, recognizes that desire-
formation under pressure is an affront to autonomy, and hence an affront to liberty. Thus, 
where privacy loss affects one’s actions with respect to reading, on the autonomy view that loss 
will be liberty-restricting regardless of whether one acts against one’s actual desires or one 
changes those desires. To illustrate, consider a case in which a member of a disfavored religious 
or political minority has reason to believe that her library’s records are scrutinized by others, 
and she worries that her normal choice of books will become known to others. She might decide 
against reading those books, despite her higher-level desire to do so; the internal, positive view 
would recognize this as a limitation of her intellectual freedom. But over time, having read lots 
of other stuff, she might lose the desire to read her previous choices and instead desire to read 
more socially palatable fare. The internal, positive view would not recognize this as a limitation 
on her freedom, but the autonomy view would. That, I believe, is an important advantage. 
The autonomy view is also notable because it has an important corollary. It can explain 
why privacy loss impinges freedom in cases of surreptitious surveillance. Much privacy loss takes 
place without people being aware of it. But autonomy is about quality of agency—one’s ability 
to act according to one’s values as one sees fit. Where important information is unavailable or 
hidden, one’s ability to act according to one’s values is compromised. Moreover, where one is 
denied important facts about the world such that one is less able to make sense of it and one’s 
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place in it, her autonomy is diminished (Hill 1984). Whether one is being surveilled is such 
information, and hence surreptitious surveillance is itself an affront to liberty, properly 
understood (Rubel 2007). And where that surreptitious surveillance is about one’s intellectual 
habits, it is an affront to intellectual freedom.  
The importance of the intellectual freedom as quality of agency view, and its relation to 
surreptitious surveillance, can be illustrated in a recent, well-known dispute regarding library 
privacy and surveillance. Section 215 of the USA Patriot Act allows the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation to order persons or entities to produce “any tangible things (including books, 
records, papers, documents, and other items) for an investigation to protect against 
international terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities.”  Patriot Act § 215(a). In addition to 
providing such broad investigative power, the section prohibits people from disclosing that the 
FBI has sought items under the section. Patriot Act § 215(d). Libraries and librarians (among 
other privacy and civil liberties advocates) have been highly critical of the section, and it has 
been cited as an important intellectual freedom issue. One response is particularly interesting 
for our purposes here. In the wake of the Act’s passage, some libraries proposed using signs 
saying “The FBI has not been here. (Watch closely for the removal of this sign)” (Penenberg, 
2004). Why, though, should the nondisclosure provision be considered important from the 
standpoint of privacy and intellectual freedom, and how would revealing investigations advance 
intellectual freedom? It does nothing to actually protect privacy, and disclosing the investigation 
could cause the sorts of chilled inquiry that are contrary to positive intellectual freedom. The 
autonomy view provides an answer: disclosure provides people with important information 
about the state of their records, and they may use that information to better understand the 
world and act accordingly—regardless of whether they become subject to constraints.  
In sum, other conceptions of freedom (and intellectual freedom) are either problematic 
in their own right or fail to provide a justification for privacy protections. However, 
understanding intellectual freedom as a quality of agency avoids the problems of other 
conceptions and can provide a ground for privacy protections. Hence, if intellectual freedom is 
to provide the justification for privacy protections, then intellectual freedom is a type of positive 
freedom, specifically a quality of agency, such that a person is free only if she acts 
autonomously. That is the third claim of the argument outlined at the start of this section.  
Combined with the premise that intellectual freedom does provide the justification for privacy 
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protections for library patrons, we can conclude that intellectual freedom must be understood 
as a quality of agency. What that implies in the context of library provision of electronic 
resources is the question for the following section.  
V. What Intellectual Freedom as Autonomy Demands 
One of the basic premises of my argument is that intellectual freedom is a fundamental library 
value. If libraries value intellectual freedom so greatly, then, assuming I am correct about the 
relationship between autonomy and intellectual freedom, it follows that libraries have reasons 
to ensure that patrons act autonomously with respect to intellectual endeavors. The idea behind 
this claim is straightforward: valuing something provides reasons for furthering that thing. That 
is simply part of what it means to value something.5 Coupled with the claim that intellectual 
freedom is important, and it is something that libraries and the library profession value greatly, 
the conclusion that libraries have reasons to ensure that patrons act autonomously with respect 
to intellectual endeavors follows. 
Thus, the commitment of libraries and the library profession to intellectual freedom 
entails a commitment to patron autonomy. That in turn underwrites several things. First, and 
least controversially, it underwrites a requirement to provide information to patrons about the 
privacy implications of their use of electronic resources. It further underwrites a moral 
commitment to providing resources in electronic formats, even those with privacy-diminishing 
personalized services and Kindle-formatted electronic books. Such provision will occur in any 
case, but the commitment to intellectual freedom also implies that electronic resources ought 
to be provided amid reasonable and attractive options (often including hardcopy versions). 
Next, and most difficult to assess, a commitment to intellectual freedom underwrites a 
commitment to fostering in persons a sense of reading independent of observation. More 
controversially, it demands that contract terms for the provision of electronic resources be 
easily publicly accessible, and provides a reason for libraries to negotiate for contracts that 
minimize the degree to which services provided by third parties are privacy-limiting. 
Information about Privacy Policies 
As noted, autonomy refers to individuals’ ability to self-govern, to make choices about matters 
that are important to them according to their values as they see fit. It is, in other words, the 
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ability to exercise control and self-determination, including the ability to make important 
decisions on the basis of one’s commitments, values, and conception of the good. A baseline 
moral duty for anyone is respect for others’ autonomy, which requires that one allow another 
person the opportunity to control certain matters for herself. As Thomas Hill Jr. states, 
“[r]especting individuals’ autonomy means granting them at least the opportunity to make their 
crucial life-affecting choices in a rational manner” (Hill 1984,  48). That is true regardless of 
whether restricting a person’s choices would be better for that person or would lead to an 
outcome that better comports with her values (Shiffrin 2000). Respect for autonomy provides 
the foundation for moral prohibitions against deception (at least in important matters and in 
substantial degrees) and coercion, as deception and coercion undermine one’s self-government 
by circumventing her will. In the context of medical care, for example, respect for autonomy 
prohibits performing a procedure on a patient capable of giving meaningful, informed consent, 
but who has not given it, regardless of whether the procedure would benefit the patient.6 The 
mere fact that the patient would make a bad choice does not provide grounds to foreclose such 
a choice.  
At a minimum, respect for autonomy requires making available, and in some cases 
providing, information necessary for a person to be able to make important decisions according 
her values, at least where one aims to induce that person to make the decision. In the 
commercial context, for example, deception about products or omission of important facts 
about products that consumers would expect to be provided is an affront to consumer 
autonomy. A number of scholars have examined the nature and role of persons’ understanding 
of privacy policies and privacy implications of information technologies, including analyzing the 
relation between persons’ understanding of privacy implications and their consent to the 
collection and use of their information (Strickland and Hunt 2005). However, whether gathering 
and use of personal information is the kind of thing for which one has a moral responsibility to 
obtain consent will depend on whether the gathering and use of personal information is 
important to the persons whose information is at issue. 
In the electronic resources context, surely information about privacy policies regarding 
reading information is important enough that disclosure of vendor policies is required for 
respecting patron autonomy. This is for several reasons. First, there is ample evidence that 
people care about whether and how their reading information is gathered and used. Opinion 
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surveys indicate that members of the public consider privacy in the online context and in the 
library context to be very important (De Rosa et al. 2007, 3:34–36, 4:36–38; Johns and Lawson 
2005, 491; Best, Krueger, and Ladewig 2006, 382–383). This is especially compelling insofar as 
there is evidence that many people are misinformed about reading privacy and how information 
is collected and analyzed. (Turow, Mulligan, and Hoofnagle 2007). Moreover, there is little cost 
to providing such information. 
Further, popular support for reading privacy and privacy regarding media consumption 
is sufficient to enshrine at least some protections into law. Almost every state in the U.S. 
protects library patron information from third party access by statute (Chmara 2009, 42, 73–92). 
In 2011 the state of California went even further by passing a law protecting reading privacy 
generally. The Reader Privacy Act prohibits any “provider of a book service…from disclosing, or 
being compelled to disclose, any personal information relating to a user of a book service, 
subject to certain exceptions.” (California SB 602, preamble). Although federal law has no 
analogous statutory protections for reading privacy, the 1988 Video Privacy Protection Act 
prohibits disclosure of persons’ purchases and borrowing of videos (18 U.S.C. § 2710 (2002)). 
Further, there is both federal and state case law protecting information about persons’ reading 
privacy on free speech grounds. In Stanley v. Georgia the U.S. Supreme Court determined that 
although the state could legitimately criminalize the possession of obscene material, such 
statutes do not extend to persons’ homes. Rather, under the First Amendment the state has “no 
business telling a man…what books he may read or what films he may watch.” 394 U.S. 557, 565 
(1969). In Tattered Cover, Inc. v. The City of Thornton, the Colorado Supreme Court determined 
that the First Amendment and free speech provisions in the Colorado constitution protect 
records of customer purchases in bookstore from state intrusion. 44 P.3d 1044 (Colo. 2002). The 
important point here is not to conduct an analysis of the legal protections for privacy in reading 
and intellectual habits. Rather, statutes and cases protecting privacy in reading and intellectual 
habits are evidence of the importance and popular support for such privacy. That, in turn, gives 
us reason to think that information regarding persons’ privacy in reading and intellectual habits 
is crucial in their exercising autonomy.  
A further reason why information about vendor privacy policies is important for 
respecting patron autonomy is that whether persons have or lack privacy with respect to 
reading and intellectual activities may affect what they read and intellectually engage with. In 
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part III I argued against the view that effects of surveillance on reading and intellectual habits 
constitute a limitation on negative intellectual freedom. But that does not mean such effects are 
unimportant. Rather they are important because the fact (if it is a fact) that disclosure affects 
behavior is evidence that the disclosure matters to people. Because disclosure matters, it is 
autonomy-respecting to make it clear to people that such disclosure occurs. That is, things that 
are important enough to affect behavior are at least prima facie things that persons have an 
autonomy interest in knowing. Thus, if disclosure is something that is important enough to 
people that it affects behavior, it is at least prima facie something that they have an autonomy 
interest in knowing. Notice how this relates to surreptitious surveillance: if our concern is that 
persons’ intellectual habits not be affected by observation (i.e., under a negative freedom or 
internal positive freedom view), surreptitious surveillance is every bit as liberty-preserving as 
non-surveillance. But if our concern is autonomy, then knowledge about surveillance is 
essential, independent of the effects of such knowledge on persons’ intellectual habits.  
Now, one can adduce evidence that in general people neither read privacy policies nor 
understand what the existence of a privacy policy actually implies (Hoofnagle and King, 2008).  
One might therefore argue that the failure to read privacy policies and failure to understand the 
meaning of privacy policies suggests that the existence of such policies does not further persons’ 
autonomy. After all, the decision not to review a policy may evince a belief that one does not 
need to understand that policy in order to make decisions according her values as she sees fit. 
Such an argument would be mistaken, however, for it equates individual decisions not to read 
and understand privacy policies with a global judgment that such policies are unimportant. The 
realistic opportunity to incorporate their values into decisions is the crucial step for respecting 
autonomy, not persons actually doing so. The protection of meaningful choice is what is 
important in respecting autonomy, not that persons actually make choices that comport with 
their values. 
Hence, respect for autonomy will at the very least demand that patrons deciding 
whether to use such resources have access to information about privacy policies and treatment 
of information about their reading habits. Access to such information would (at least in 
principle) allow patrons to decide whether potentially disclosing information to third parties 
comports with their values, and thus would allow them to exercise autonomy over (for example) 
decisions to use personalized interfaces or borrow Kindle books. As figures 1 and 2 illustrated, 
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some libraries are doing just this. When patrons log into their Kindle accounts to borrow books, 
the library in the example provides a disclaimer that their personal information may not be 
protected as it is with the library’s domain. 
A more widespread issue with respect to providing information about privacy effects of 
electronic resources concerns licensing contracts. Some commentators have noted that such 
contracts may have provisions that affect patron privacy (Lipinski 2013; Harris 2009). For 
example, they may require a library to monitor patron activity for unauthorized use, notify 
publishers of any unauthorized uses, or keep track of usage logs to aid in investigations 
surrounding unauthorized use. Likewise, because publishers are not bound by state library 
privacy laws, they may be able to collect information about patron activity that is not subject to 
library collection. Hence, library commitment to privacy may not extend to stringent license 
provisions. Moreover, many publishers seek to keep licensing contracts confidential for the sake 
of business competitiveness (Lipinski 2013, 425-27;  Harris 2009, 85-86). Where the contracts 
are with publicly funded libraries, they are often available through open records requests. 
However, those require some effort and are not applicable to private institutions. The 
framework offered here suggests that contracts should be made readily available, and that 
institutions valuing intellectual freedom should avoid contracts requiring confidentiality about 
terms, regardless of whether disclosure is available via open records laws. (Though intellectual 
freedom may not demand as easy access to pricing information, at least for private institutions.) 
Providing such information is, again, a bare minimum requirement of the basic moral 
principle of respect for autonomy, and such disclosure requirements are the heart of much 
privacy law. But given their antecedent commitment to intellectual freedom, libraries are a 
special case. That commitment provides reasons to do more than a bare minimum to respect 
patron autonomy, for the reasons that follow. 
Provision of Resources 
The requirement that libraries disclose information about the potential for electronic resources 
to diminish patron privacy is a conditional requirement: if libraries provide access to electronic 
resources such as personalized interfaces or Kindle book borrowing, then they have a moral 
obligation to disclose information about the ways in which such resources may diminish patron 
privacy. Notice, though, that if intellectual freedom, and hence autonomy, requires only 
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disclosure of potential privacy diminution, then a library could fulfill a commitment to 
intellectual freedom simply by not offering resources that potentially diminish privacy. On the 
negative view of intellectual freedom described above, information disclosure and a decision 
not to provide access to electronic resources that may diminish privacy would equally protect 
intellectual freedom.  
But the account of intellectual freedom outlined here entails more. Recall that the 
argument in this paper rests on the premise that intellectual freedom is a foundational value for 
libraries and the library profession. Autonomy may be expanded, promoted, or protected, and 
from the claim that intellectual freedom is valuable it follows that expanding, promoting, or 
protecting it is valuable. In this context, autonomy can be promoted or expanded by the 
promotion or expansion of options over which persons can exercise freedom. Hence, there is 
good reason to provide electronic resources, even where they pose some threat to patron 
privacy (as with those providing customized services to individual patrons and as with Kindle 
book lending), because doing so expands the options over which persons can exercise 
intellectual freedom. 
The suggestion that libraries should provide resources in electronic formats is of course 
pushing on an open door. That is what libraries do, have been doing, and will continue to do. 
The important point here, though, is that a basis for providing access to such resources is 
intellectual freedom and autonomy. Discussions regarding intellectual freedom and electronic 
resource access often focus on issues that arise once there is already some sort of electronic 
access in place: Internet filtering, equal opportunity to access, restrictions based on content, 
and so forth (see ALA 2010, 39–40, 73–75). This focus reflects a negative account of intellectual 
freedom: one’s freedom is impinged where some external constraint is imposed on her ability to 
act. Filters, content restrictions, and barriers based on economic or cultural factors would 
appear to be external constraints on access to resources that are already available. But on the 
account offered here, rather than intellectual freedom potentially conflicting with the advent of 
privacy-threatening electronic resources, electronic resources and privacy are different facets of 
intellectual freedom itself.  
Returning to the examples discussed in section two, providing access to vendor services 
that allow personalized interfaces, saved searches, and the like would indeed appear to 
promote persons’ intellectual freedom by expanding their abilities to use such resources 
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effectively. In light of the Pew research discussed above, there do appear to be important 
impediments to patrons’ ability to read electronic books. That is a limitation on intellectual 
freedom, properly understood. And there is no question that access to scholarly publications in 
electronic formats is crucial for academic research, and foregoing licenses for such publications 
would certainly limit intellectual freedom within that domain. This is a point worth emphasizing, 
and it will become crucial in considering the nature of tradeoffs between access to electronic 
resources and privacy protections, as noted below.  
Choice Amid Reasonable Options 
If the view presented here is correct, and intellectual freedom is best understood as a quality of 
agency (viz., autonomy), and hence availability of electronic resources is a facet of intellectual 
freedom, there is a further question as to whether any expansion of options is ipso facto 
freedom-expanding, and hence autonomy-promoting. To address that question consider why 
autonomy is important in the first place.  
Autonomy is important because persons are capable of arriving at their own 
conceptions of what is good, determining what is of value in their lives, and making decisions 
that comport with those views. But that capability is valuable not as a function of mere choice; 
adding lots of unattractive choices to a person’s lot does nothing to increase her ability to 
govern herself or incorporate values into her decisions as she sees fit (Raz, 1988, 408–410). 
After all, a person’s ability to select, say, several flavors of sawdust to eat constitutes a choice, 
but it does not amount to an ability to exercise autonomy with respect to one’s dinner (and a 
fortiori does not amount to an ability to exercise autonomy in any morally worthwhile way). 
Rather, one’s ability to act autonomously is realized, and is made valuable, by the existence of 
good choices—choices that may actually align with persons’ conceptions of the good.  
Returning, then, to potentially privacy-diminishing electronic resources, whether such 
options further patrons’ autonomy (which is to say their intellectual freedom) will depend on 
whether they are, first, actually useful and desirable, and second, whether they are available 
alongside other actually useful and desirable options. Consider again Kindle book lending. The 
evidence from Pew suggests that readers do consider having the option to read books on 
Kindles and Kindle-enabled devices to be attractive. But privacy-protection is valuable, too, for 
the reasons noted above: it is both valued and its loss affects persons’ behaviors. Hence, simply 
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providing books in Kindle format may advance one aspect of autonomy, but would not 
necessarily advance patron autonomy on balance because there would be no other, privacy-
protecting way for patrons to borrow those books. 
We can see the point slightly differently by comparing two possibilities. In one, a 
popular book is available to patrons only in an electronic format that requires a patron to share 
her information with a third party, such as Kindle via Overdrive. In the other, that book is 
available in both the electronic, information-sharing format and in hard copy, where records of 
individual patron access are retained only while the book is checked out. The second scenario 
promotes autonomy, and hence intellectual freedom, in a way that the first does not. In each 
case patrons have the negative liberty to read the book without interference, but in the first 
scenario the only alternative to sharing personal information is forgoing the opportunity to 
borrow the book altogether. But that is not an attractive alternative to someone who both 
wishes to read the book and values her privacy regarding her reading habits. Both of those 
desiderata are utterly reasonable. Thus, because the second scenario provides greater 
opportunity to consider reasonable alternatives, it better promotes autonomy, and hence better 
comports with the value of intellectual freedom.  
Now one might argue that patrons would in any case have the opportunity to purchase 
the book in whatever format it is available, and her intellectual freedom is therefore equally well 
preserved in either case. But such an argument would have to rest on the negative conception 
of freedom, which I have argued above is inadequate as a conception of intellectual freedom.  
A more difficult issue is tradeoffs between aspects of intellectual freedom. In the 
example of choosing hard-copy and electronic versions of a book, intellectual freedom creates a 
substantial reason in favor of obtaining copies in both formats. That is not, though, an all-things-
considered judgment or a categorical obligation to acquire resources in multiple formats. 
Collection budgets are limited, and it may be that patrons overwhelmingly choose electronic 
formats, even if they are aware of potential privacy concerns. In that case, it may well be that 
autonomy is better promoted overall by foregoing privacy-preserving options. 
Moreover, it is well-recognized that the market for electronic books is unsettled and the 
ways in which electronic books will be available in libraries in the future is unclear. Current 
availability is far less than demand, access is often cumbersome, and prices seem high (Pew 
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2012b, 52-62). Wider availability, easier access, and lower prices may end up coming at the price 
of sharing patron information that can in turn be used for commercial purposes. That is, libraries 
might be able to offer greater accessibility by entering into licensing agreements that allow 
publishers to collect, use, and share individually identifiable patron information—for example by 
requiring patrons to have accounts with the publisher. But if we understand intellectual 
freedom as I have argued we should, we cannot examine such arrangements as a limitation on 
intellectual freedom in favor of greater access. Rather, it must be understood as a tradeoff 
between different aspects of intellectual freedom.  
In light of the difficulty of assessing such tradeoffs, it is worth noting the limitations of 
the account offered here. Because access and privacy are both aspects of intellectual freedom, 
and because they may conflict in any number of ways, decisions about collection development 
will inevitably result in tradeoffs. Hence, whether it is worth foregoing a resource because of 
privacy concerns, or whether it would be worth accepting a discount on licensed resources in 
exchange for greater access to patron information (freeing up money for better access to other 
resources), will be the stuff of negotiation.7 However, the fact that there is a tradeoff in 
intellectual freedom provides a reason in favor of more aggressive contract negotiations, a point 
to which I return below.  
Fostering Independent Development of Reading 
One of the reasons in favor of the view of freedom offered here is that it provides an account of 
why formation of desires may be freedom-limiting. Freedom on this view requires that persons 
be able to develop desires, values, and character amid opportunity to consider and reflect on 
reasonable alternatives. Applied to intellectual freedom, it requires that persons be able to 
develop intellectual proclivities, reading preferences, and the like with sufficient opportunity to 
consider and reflect on other intellectual avenues. There is a prominent thread in the 
philosophical privacy literature arguing that the value of privacy is closely related to just such 
opportunity. These are often referred to as “personhood” or “personal dignity” accounts of 
privacy’s value (Allen 1988, 43). Jeffrey Reiman, for example, argues that privacy is important to 
confer “moral title” to one’s existence (Reiman 1976, 39). The idea seems to be that the extent 
to which one is morally responsible (either praiseworthy or blameworthy) depends on the 
extent to which one’s values and choices are one’s own. Further, one’s choices and values are 
ensured to be one’s own where those choices and values develop beyond others’ scrutiny. That 
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is, the extent to which others observe a person may cause her to develop her character and 
values in such a way that reflects those others’ values rather than being the product of her own 
thoughts. See also (Bloustein 1964). Of course there is no such thing as character and value 
formation outside of others’ observations, and it is not desirable that persons’ values form 
without guidance from others, including one’s family and community. The point, though, is that 
there ought to be some refuge from others’ observation to allow persons the opportunity to 
develop their characters and values for their own reasons.  
Such views illustrate the relation between privacy and desire formation—lack of privacy 
in important domains may undermine the degree to which one’s desires, values, and character 
are one’s own. Compare this to the account of intellectual freedom I have argued for here, 
according to which intellectual freedom is a function of whether one’s intellectual values, 
desires, and character form with ample opportunity to consider and reflect upon reasonable 
alternatives. The personhood accounts base privacy’s value on precisely that opportunity to 
form one’s character, values, and desires with the opportunity to consider reasonable 
alternatives. Privacy helps afford such an opportunity.  
In terms of library practices, this would imply that there should be ample opportunity 
for resource use without information collection and that persons be able to develop intellectual 
habits with limited information disclosure. There should be enough availability of different 
modes of information provision that no one would need to obtain most information, or most 
information of any one type, subject to monitoring.  This in part reinforces the need for choice 
amid reasonable options.  
More important, the issue of value formation gives rise to a duty to protect children’s 
and young persons’ reading and intellectual privacy. The account of intellectual freedom offered 
here is neutral with respect to the actual reading habits and desires of adults. What matters is 
that they have the opportunity to form those habits and desires with ample opportunity to 
consider and reflect upon reasonable options. Further, as we’ve seen, the formation of values 
and desires from an early age without such opportunity is an affront to autonomy. Hence, if 
young persons’ reading habits and intellectual proclivities are scrutinized to the point that they 
will reflexively steer away from reasonable alternatives, it is a limitation on their autonomy as 
adults. Again, this is not to say that there are no legitimate reasons to observe children’s reading 
habits. Rather, it provides a reason in favor of some degree of privacy.  
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Professional library organizations already endorse privacy for children and young 
persons, but there may be further responsibilities. Suppose, for example, that a library wishes to 
establish a system to provide homework help for children. In order to induce children to use the 
service, they develop an application for use on a social-networking site the children already use. 
But, as with all such applications (based on the network’s architecture), information collected 
will be sharable with other third parties. In other words, children’s intellectual activities would 
be subject to monitoring, tied to their social network account.8  One worry is that the users 
would develop habits, and hence desires, consistent with others’ monitoring. That is at least 
potentially a worry from the perspective of autonomy. 
Emerging Issue: Contract Provisions 
I have already discussed the importance of information about vendor privacy policies in 
respecting patron privacy, and one of the issues outlined in section two is licensing contracts for 
electronic resources. Because both e-books and electronic journal subscriptions are governed by 
contract, it is particularly important to scrutinize contract language for issues of access and 
privacy in the service of intellectual freedom. Scholars have examined how conceptions of 
authorized users have developed in licensing contracts (Zhu and Eschenfelder, 2010), which is a 
key issue for access. However, the degree to which such contracts bear upon patron privacy has 
not been systematically addressed. Preliminary results in an ongoing project examining privacy 
provisions of licensing agreements between libraries and content providers (publishers and 
aggregators) show that many contracts require libraries to monitor patron traffic for 
unauthorized uses—which is to say uses prohibited under the licensing agreement. Some may 
require that libraries identify users engaged in unauthorized use and reporting them to the 
provider (see [cite redacted]), and others require that libraries assist in the investigation of 
unauthorized uses. Surely such provisions are relevant to patron privacy and at least warrant 
disclosure, for reasons noted above.  
 It remains to be seen just how pervasive such provisions are, whether and how licensing 
contracts evolve, and the actual effects of the provisions on patron privacy. Nonetheless, it is an 
issue worth examining in that disclosure of contract terms may be every bit as important for 
protecting patron autonomy—and intellectual freedom—as notice of vendor privacy policies. 
More importantly, contract provisions may be an important place to press for greater 
protections for reader privacy. While Kindle’s business model may have made it important for 
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Amazon to have access to user information, it is not clear that the same is true for journal 
publishers.  
VI. Conclusion  
On its surface, this paper aims to address a vexing question in LIS about how to assess tradeoffs 
between provision of electronic resources and library patron privacy. But because privacy 
protections are justified by intellectual freedom, the deeper purpose of the paper is examining 
the nature of intellectual freedom and its relation to privacy. In doing so, I have argued that 
intellectual freedom should be understood as a quality of agency, such that a person is 
intellectually free only if she acts autonomously with respect to intellectual endeavors. But 
autonomy demands more than simply protecting privacy, and libraries’ commitment to 
intellectual freedom in the context of electronic resource provision demands more than mere 
disclosure of privacy policies. Rather, it demands providing electronic resources, providing them 
amid reasonable and attractive options, and ensuring that patrons develop intellectual 
preferences and desires independent of observation. Of course any number of questions 
remain. Perhaps the most important is the stringency of these requirements, and how they 
should weigh in decisions about licensing access to electronic resources. But in any case that 
assessment should be based on the proper conception and requirements of intellectual 
freedom.  
Notes 
1. In his introduction to a special issue of Library Trends addressing the Library Bill of 
Rights, Wiegand (1996) laments what he sees as a tendency of LIS scholars and library 
professionals to speak more to one another than to address scholarship and trends in cognate 
fields. Hopefully that has improved in the years since, as professional and academic inquiry has 
worked increasingly across disciplines. Nonetheless, it is an important critique to keep in mind. 
2. One limitation of the negative conception is the difficulty of determining whether 
particular constraints are external to an agent or not. A person’s inability to read a text is in 
some circumstances not an external constraint, for example where the text is in a “dead” 
language. In other circumstances it is less clear, as when the person has been forced by 
economic conditions to work rather than attend school, and hence has not achieved the level of 
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literacy needed to read a document most people in a society are able to read. This conceptual 
difficulty is in my view a mark against the negative freedom view, though others make a case for 
expanding the conception of negative freedom (see, for example, (Cohen 2011)). 
3. A classic criticism of this sort of view is the possibility of the “contented slave.” Suppose 
that Scarlett is owned under a chattel slave law. Unlike most slaves, though, she is provided with 
substantial material support, is not required to work, and can come and go from her home 
frequently. As it happens, she does not wish to go frequently. She may have her every wish 
fulfilled, but as a matter of chance she never comes to wish to leave altogether. If she tried, she 
would be prevented. But because her desire is to stay, she does not try. There are no constraints 
on her actual desires. Hence, on the internal positive freedom view, and on the one freedom 
view, Scarlett is free. But that cannot be the case, for she is a slave; she would be prevented 
from doing something that it would be utterly reasonable and morally permissible for her to do. 
That i the very antithesis of being free.  
4. One might be tempted to attribute Scarlett’s lack of freedom to there being a possible 
desire (i.e., to leave her owner) that is thwarted. But allowing that constraints on possible 
desires constitute losses of freedom renders the notion of constraints vacuous. Anything is a 
constraint on some possible desire. Even material wealth is a constraint on the possible desire 
to authentically experience poverty, but to call wealth liberty-limiting would render the concept 
of liberty meaningless (see Christman 1991).  
 5. Of course it may be true that in this time and place internal positive intellectual freedom 
provides a reason in favor of strong privacy protections. But the fact that it may not always do 
so weakens the connection between intellectual freedom and privacy on the internal positive 
account. Because this project is to determine whether there is a philosophically-defensible 
connection between intellectual freedom and privacy, that weakness provides a reason to 
search further.  
6. The first premise of the main argument states that intellectual freedom is important 
independent of whether anyone places value on it. That independent value is a reason for 
persons to care, and why its importance in libraries is appropriate.  
7. Thanks to an anonymous review for Library Quarterly for this point.  
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8.  Thanks to Michael Zimmer for the example. 
References 
Allen, Anita L. 1988. Uneasy Access: Privacy for Women in a Free Society. Totowa, N.J.: Rowman 
& Littlefield. 
American Library Association. 2010. Intellectual Freedom Manual. 8th ed. Chicago: American 
Library Association. 
———. 2002. “Privacy: An Interpretation of the Library Bill of Rights.” 
http://www.ala.org/advocacy/intfreedom/librarybill/interpretations/privacy 
Berlin, Isaiah. (1969). Four Essays on Liberty. London: Oxford University Press. 
Best, Samuel J., Brian S. Krueger, and Jeffrey Ladewig. 2006. “The Polls--Trends: Privacy in the 
Information Age.” Public Opinion Quarterly 70 (3): 375–401. 
Blitz, Marc Jonathan. 2005. “Constitutional Safeguards for Silent Experiments in Living: Libraries, 
the Right to Read, and a First Amendment Theory for an Unaccompanied Right to 
Recieve Information.” UMKC Law Review 74: 799. 
Bloustein, Edward. 1964. “Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity: An Answer to Dean Prosser.” 
New York University Law Review 39: 962–1007. 
Bowers, Stacey L. 2006. “Privacy and Library Records.” The Journal of Academic Librarianship 32 
(4) (July): 377–383. doi:10.1016/j.acalib.2006.03.005. 
Carter, Ian. 2008. Positive and Negative Liberty. In E. N. Zalta (Ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy (Fall 2008.). Retrieved from 
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2008/entries/liberty-positive-negative/ 
Chmara, Theresa. 2009. Privacy and Confidentiality Issues: A Guide for Libraries and Their 
Lawyers. 1st ed. American Library Association Editions. 
Christman, John. 1991. “Liberalism and Individual Positive Freedom.” Ethics 101 (2) (January 1): 
343–359. 
———. 2005. “Saving Positive Freedom.” Political Theory 33 (1) (February 1): 79–88. 
Cohen, G. A. 2011. “Freedom and Money.” In On the Currency of Egalitarian Justice, and Other 
Essays in Political Philosophy, 166–192. Princeton University Press. 
Cohen, Julie E. 2001. “Information Rights and Intellectual Freedom.” In Ethics and the Internet 
11-32, ed. Anton Vedder. Antwerp: Intersentia.  
———. 1996. “A Right to Read Anonymously: A Closer Look at Copyright Management in 
Cyberspace.” Connecticut Law Review 28: 981 
Corrado, E.M. 2007 Privacy and Library 2.0: How Do They Conflict? In H. Thompson, ed., Sailing 
into the Future: Charting Our Destiny: Proceedings of the Thirteenth National 
Conference of the Association of College and Research Libraries, March 29-April 1, 2007, 
Baltimore, Maryland. Chicago: ACRL. 
De Rosa, Cathy, Joanne Cantrell, Andy Havens, Janet Hawk, and Lillie Jenkins. 2007. Sharing, 
Privacy and Trust in Our Networked World: a  Report to the OCLC Membership. Dublin, 
Ohio: OCLC. http://www.oclc.org/reports/pdfs/sharing.pdf. 
Dresang, Eliza T. 2006. “Intellectual Freedom and Libraries: Complexity and Change in the 
Twenty‐First‐Century Digital Environment.” The Library Quarterly 76 (2) (April 1): 169–
192. 
Goldberg, B. 2011. Librarians Weigh Kindle Ebook Lending against Reader Privacy. Retrieved 
February 15, 2012, from http://americanlibrariesmagazine.org/e-content/librarians-
weigh-kindle-ebook-lending-against-reader-privacy.  
30 
 
DRAFT: Please cite to final version, Library Quarterly 84(2) (April 2014):183-208. 
 
Harris, Lesley, Ellen. 2009. Licensing Digital Content: A Practical Guide for Librarians. 2nd ed. 
Chicago: American Library Association. 
Hill, Thomas Jr. 1984. “Autonomy and Benevolent Lies.” Journal of Value Inquiry 18: 251–297. 
Hoofnagle, Chris Jay and Jennifer King. 2008. “What Californians Understand about Privacy 
Online.” Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1262130. 
International Federation of Library Associations and Institutions (IFLA). 1999. “Statement on 
Libraries and Intellectual Freedom.” http://www.ifla.org/publications/ifla-statement-on-
libraries-and-intellectual-freedom. 
Johns, Steven, and Karen Lawson. 2005. “University Undergraduate Students and Library-related 
Privacy Issues.” Library & Information Science Research 27 (4): 485–495. 
doi:10.1016/j.lisr.2005.08.006.  
Lipinski, Tomas A. 2013. The Librarian’s Legal Companion for Licensing Information Resources 
and Services. Chicago: Neal-Schuman. 
Litwin, R. (2006). The Central Problem of Library 2.0: Privacy. In R. Litwin, ed., Library Juice 
Concentrate (pp. 71-74). Duluth, Minn.: Library Juice Press. 
MacCallum, Gerald C. 1967. “Negative and Positive Freedom.” The Philosophical Review 76 (3) 
(July 1): 312–334. doi:10.2307/2183622. 
Magi, Trina J. 2010. “A Content Analysis of Library Vendor Privacy Policies: Do They Meet Our 
Standards?” College & Research Libraries 71 (3) (May): 254–272. 
———. 2011. “Fourteen Reasons Privacy Matters: A Multidisciplinary Review of Scholarly 
Literature.” The Library Quarterly 81 (2) (April 1): 187–209. doi:10.1086/658870. 
Nelson, Eric. 2005. “Liberty: One Concept Too Many?” Political Theory 33 (1) (February 1): 58–
78. 
Parry, Marc. 2012. “As Libraries Go Digital, Sharing of Data Is at Odds With Tradition of Privacy.” 
The Chronicle of Higher Education, November 5, sec. Technology. 
http://chronicle.com/article/As-Libraries-Go-Digital/135514/. 
Pew Research Center. 2012a. “Tablet and E-book Reader Ownership Surge in the Holiday Gift-
giving Period.” http://pewinternet.org/Reports/2012/E-readers-and-
tablets/Findings.aspx. 
———. 2012b. “The Rise of E-reading.” http://libraries.pewinternet.org/2012/04/04/the-rise-of-
e-reading/.  
———. 2013. “E-book Reading Jumps; Print Book Reading Declines.” 
http://libraries.pewinternet.org/2012/12/27/e-book-reading-jumps-print-book-reading-
declines/. 
Raz, Joseph. 1988. The morality of freedom. Oxford Oxfordshire; New York: Clarendon Press; 
Oxford University Press. 
Reiman, Jeffrey H. 1976. “Privacy, Intimacy, and Personhood.” Philosophy and Public Affairs 6 
(1): 26–44. 
Richards, Neil M. 2008. “Intellectual Privacy.” Texas Law Review 87: 387. 
Shiffrin, Seana Valentine. 2000. “Paternalism, Unconscionability Doctrine, and Accommodation.” 
Philosophy & Public Affairs 29 (3) (July 1): 205–250. 
Strickland, Lee S., and Laura E. Hunt. 2005. “Technology, Security, and Individual Privacy: New 
Tools, New Threats, and New Public Perceptions.” Journal of the American Society for 
Information Science and Technology 56 (3): 221–234. doi:10.1002/asi.20122. 
Turow, Joseph, Deirdre K. Mulligan, and Chris J Hoofnagle. 2007. Research Report: Consumers 
Fundamentality Misunderstand the Online Advertising Marketplace. University of 
Pennsylvania Annenberg School for Communication and University of California 
31 
 
DRAFT: Please cite to final version, Library Quarterly 84(2) (April 2014):183-208. 
 
Berkeley Law Samuelson Law, Technology & Public Policy Clinic. 
www.law.berkeley.edu/files/annenberg_samuelson_advertising.pdf.  
USA Patriot Act. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to 
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107–156, 115 Stat. 272. 
Wiegand, Wayne. 1996. “Introduction.” Library Trends 45(1): 1-6. 
Zhu, Xiaohua, and Kristin R. Eschenfelder. 2010. “Social Construction of Authorized Users in the 
Digital Age.” College & Research Libraries 71 (6) (November 1): 548–568. 
 
 
